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Hegel and Spinoza: Substance and Negativity 
By Gregor Moder
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2017, pbk $34.95 (ISBN 978-0-
8101-3543-7), pp. 200 
By Robb Dunphy
Perhaps the first thing to point out about this curious book is that its title is somewhat 
misleading. Anyone approaching it expecting a focused, comparative account of the work 
of Hegel and Spinoza on the subjects of metaphysics, logic, or even political philosophy 
will be to some extent disappointed. While these areas of inquiry are touched upon, the 
book primarily investigates relations between the ‘Hegelian’ and ‘Spinozist’ legacies in 
20th century European thought, perhaps most overtly in the explicitly politically oriented 
‘materialisms’ of thinkers like Althusser and Žižek.  
     The second thing to point out goes some way towards mitigating the misleading effect 
indicated by the first. Moder’s title clearly recalls Pierre Macherey’s 1979 work, Hegel ou 
Spinoza. Macherey’s book likewise represents an intervention into the materialist theory 
of the time, although perhaps less explicitly so than Moder’s.   Macherey’s account of 
Hegel’s misreadings of Spinoza, and of Spinoza’s purported incompatibility with Hegel’s 
systematic thought, culminates in a rejection of the element of teleology present in some 
Hegelian Marxist accounts of socio-historical analysis. Here I am over-simplifying the 
matter somewhat. However, it does seem as though Macherey suggests that contemporary 
theorists and philosophers must choose which legacy to affirm: Hegelianism, with its 
teleology and idealism, or Spinozism as strict materialism, with its rejection of the notion of 
teleology. It is clear that Macherey leans heavily towards the latter.
     As Mladen Dolar points out in his foreword (xi), Moder’s book, without ignoring 
significant differences between both Hegel and Spinoza, and between the Hegelianisms 
and Spinozisms of the 20th century, is an attempt at a more inclusive approach. Specifically, 
Moder is interested in identifying commonalities between Spinozism and Hegelianism that 
can be occluded by the polemical opposing of these two intellectual legacies by thinkers 
like Macherey, and in the possibility that reading Hegel and Spinoza together (even if not 
always in harmony) might provide useful resources for considering issues at the heart of 
contemporary materialism, for example, the theory of ideology and the place of the idea of 
the negative. 
     There is clearly an important set of relations between scholarly interpretations of the 
positions of figures in the history of philosophy and interventions into contemporary 
philosophy where one finds thinkers laying claim to the inheritance of a particular 
intellectual legacy, even though they clearly depart in a number of significant ways from 
the forbear they choose to emphasise. There is also nothing inherently problematic about 
attempting some amount of both kinds of work in one book, or of developing work in the 
latter category on the basis of work done in the former, as Macherey did when he used his 
criticisms of Hegel’s reading of Spinoza to motivate a rejection of certain ‘Hegelian’ tropes 
in the philosophy of his day. However, this kind of work requires that one be careful to 
indicate precisely where one is dealing with Hegel, say, and where one is dealing with 
contemporary self-described ‘Hegelianisms’ such as those of Žižek or Badiou. A problem 
running throughout Moder’s book is that these waters are muddied. 
     I shall now give a rundown of the principal contents of the book. It does, however, seem 
important to note from the outset that it is frequently unclear, especially in Chapters 3-5 
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and in the Conclusion, whether Moder’s focus is on Hegel and Spinoza, or on contemporary 
‘Hegelianisms’ and ‘Spinozisms’.
     Moder’s Introduction begins with a straightforward rehearsal of Spinoza’s influence 
on Hegel’s thought, Hegel’s interpretations of what he took to be key Spinozist positions 
and principles, and the criticisms that Hegel levelled against Spinoza’s philosophy on that 
basis. It also provides a brief but helpful account of some of the main ways in which it is 
common to think that Hegel misread or misrepresented Spinoza.   This section then morphs 
into a discussion of Althusser’s and Macherey’s criticisms of Hegelian dialectics, with the 
interesting suggestion that both Hegel’s critical attitude towards Spinoza and modern French 
Spinozist critical attitudes towards Hegel depend upon understanding their opponent as 
committed to a kind of Neoplatonist model of ontology (10-11). Moder agrees with Deleuze 
that it is a mistake to read Spinoza as a Neoplatonist, instead identifying a distinctive model 
of ‘immanent causality’ whereby the effect is not distinct from its cause (10). In addition, 
contra Althusser and Macherey, Moder argues that by understanding the Hegelian idea of 
‘absolute knowing’ as analogous to a ‘punctuation mark’ at the end of a sentence, i.e., as that 
which gives meaning to what has gone before it rather than representing some substantive 
new content, he is able to claim that Hegel, in turn, is innocent of the charge of adhering to a 
teleological, ‘inverted’ Neoplatonism (13). This puts Moder in a position to reconsider what 
Hegelianism and Spinozism have to say about causality and teleology in the book without 
having to suppose that they are radically opposed: Hegelians to a pseudo-Spinozist idea of 
‘simple negation’ (9) distinguishing substance from its modes, and Spinozists to a pseudo-
Hegelian theological teleology (12).
     Chapter 1 focusses on the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. Moder offers a complex, even 
occasionally bewildering account of the relationship between the concepts of being and 
nothing that requires paying attention to ‘the difference between to think and not to think’ 
(22). The key interpretative move on Moder’s part is to suggest that ‘Logic begins by 
admitting its failing, by declaring its own incapacity to speak, and by doing so it nevertheless 
finds its own voice’ (19). I see little in Hegel’s Logic to suggest that he is committed to such 
an account of the beginning, so I am inclined to think that here as elsewhere Moder’s quite 
creative reconstruction of what is going on in the text has less to do with understanding 
or evaluating Hegel’s thought and more to do with the development of new concepts or 
positions relevant to interventions in contemporary theory. At the heart of the chapter 
is Moder’s reconstruction of Hegel’s comments to the effect that the nature of scientific 
inquiry is clarified only within scientific investigation as a commitment to an explicitly 
paradoxical notion of limit between what is internal and what is external to logic (28). 
Beyond what seems to me to be rather a forced imposition of this paradoxical concept of 
limit onto the Hegelian text, it is not obvious what this chapter is doing in Moder’s book. If 
the comparison between Hegel and Spinoza is taking place at the level of metaphysics, then 
focusing only on the most indeterminate concepts of being, nothing and becoming would 
seem to tell us very little about Hegel’s philosophical position. If it takes place at the level 
of an inquiry into how to begin, there is little presented here to suggest that Spinoza has a 
great deal to say on this topic. Indeed, the chapter is entitled Hegel’s Logic of Pure Being 
and Spinoza, but the latter is almost entirely absent from it. He is mentioned briefly only 
four times by my count, and never in a context which suggests that he has much to add to 
the matter being discussed. 
     Chapter 2 reconstructs Hegel’s critical attitude to the philosophy of (i) ‘the Orient’ (as 
Hegel understands it) (37-43); (ii) the Eleatics (44-48); (iii) Aristotle’s notion of a primary 
cause (48-50), and (iv) Neoplatonist metaphysics (51-54). It then goes on to argue, as in the 
introduction, that it is a mistake to understand Spinoza’s ‘immanent causality’ on any of 
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these models. This chapter is loosely connected to the first in that it acknowledges Hegel’s 
suspect suggestion that we should expect to see the dialectical development of logic from 
its simplest account of being to its grasp of the concept or the idea proper mirrored to 
some extent in the history of philosophy (39). However, the key interpretative claim that 
Hegel misreads Spinoza, and that therefore there might be some non-dialectical account of 
causality and difference as championed by 20th century Spinozists like Deleuze,  seems to 
have little to do with Hegel’s curious attitude towards the history of philosophy. That said, 
having introduced the notion of a logical progression of history in building up to the claim 
about how Hegel gets Spinoza wrong, Moder is now in a position to interrogate the notion 
of teleology which has attracted so much anti-Hegelian ire. This is the central focus of the 
third chapter.
     This third chapter is, however, for the most part not an interrogation of the notion of 
teleology in Hegel’s work. Instead, we find an attempt to rehabilitate a less metaphysically 
or politically objectionable version of this notion by way of a detour through, first, Žižek and 
Gadamer, who discuss the notion of an origin as a paradoxical kind of limit encountered 
already in Chapter 1 (59-62) and the notion of subjectivity (62-66). Moder then continues with 
sections on Heidegger and ‘the fourfold’ (69-71) and Brentanian geometry (71-75) before 
finally arriving back at Hegel, armed presumably with an improved account of teleology 
which, if read into him, can save him or Hegelian Marxism from critics like Althusser and 
Macherey. It would be fruitless to try to give an account of what goes on in the sections 
listed above, but the vital point seems to be Moder’s insistence upon the notion of a telos 
as a punctuation mark – something that the process leading up to it is undeniably building 
towards, but which, rather than representing a substantive outcome, refers us back to the 
meaning of what has gone before and allows us to comprehend it. Moder also generously 
yet questionably attributes to Hegel the view that his own tendency to view the history of 
philosophy as culminating in some sense in his own work is, in fact, nothing but a ‘gesture’ 
(78), put forward in such a way as to remain fundamentally aware that it is in fact not the 
final word on the matter but another fallible step in an ongoing philosophical conversation. 
     Spinoza is once again mostly absent from Chapter 3 but pops up mid-way through to 
emphasise the importance of noting two different ways of conceptualising Moder’s idea 
of a metaphysical punctuation mark. Or, put differently, two different accounts of the 
motif of the negative, which Moder’s quasi-Hegelian analyses of the notions of limit and 
of teleology have led him to assert as essential to the notion of substance or being. These 
two models are that of the ‘gap’ or lack and ‘torsion’ or curvature (65). The former will be 
familiar to readers acquainted with Žižek’s highly Lacanian reinterpretation of Hegel. The 
latter, Moder suggests slightly mysteriously, is the idea that ‘boundary is all there ever was 
and that existence is a function of that delimitation line’ (63). What seems to be important to 
Moder is that this account of the negative might be compatible with Spinoza’s thought in a 
way that Žižek’s talk of a gap or lack in substance could never be. The claim that Spinozism 
is able to think a kind of negativity is a good example of Moder’s attempt to read (a certain) 
Spinoza and (a certain) Hegel together. 
     Chapter 4 takes an interesting left turn through discussions of death, comedy, and 
negativity in Hegel and Spinoza, but equally in the work of recent thinkers who make use 
of the former two, including Malabou, Zupančič, Deleuze, Negri, Althusser, Macherey and 
various others. I will not attempt to retrace Moder’s steps here, but the end result of this 
chapter is an attempt to locate the possibility of a kind of negativity within Spinoza’s own 
apparently purely affirmationist model of thought, and of substance. There is much that is 
interesting in this chapter, and it ties together important material from earlier in the text. For 
instance, Moder argues for a conception of Spinozist substance which is fundamentally ‘in 
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relation with itself’ (99) in such a way as to constitute something like the kind of negativity 
as torsion to which he had alluded earlier, and further that this Spinozism might even be 
compatible with the kind of teleological thinking gestured at in Chapter 3, notwithstanding 
Spinoza’s apparently overt hostility to the notion of a final cause (101). 
     The final chapter provides a reading of Althusser on the basis of the less-incompatible-
than-previously-thought Hegelian and Spinozist motifs Moder has developed so far in the 
work. This is perhaps the most concentrated engagement with a single figure in the book, 
and it is curious that it is neither Spinoza nor Hegel. Moder might respond by saying that 
it is, in fact, both, because ‘Althusser is the incarnation of the problem that we have decided 
to call the problem of Hegel and Spinoza’ (120). The engagement with Althusser ranges 
over the nature of materialism, the theory of ideology, and the relation between theory and 
practice. Despite acknowledging Althusser’s pronouncements of his own Spinozism (105) 
and his occasional hostility to Hegel (116), Moder claims to find evidence in his work of 
both ‘conceptions of negativity … at work simultaneously at all times’ (120): the Žižekian-
Hegelian conception of lack and Moder’s proposed Spinozist conception of torsion. 
     Finally, Moder suggests that his renewed Hegelian and Spinozist Althusser is indicative 
of the possibilities for making progress in the type of debates typified, for example, by 
‘controversies between contemporary Deleuzians and contemporary Lacanians’ insofar as 
these have been conducted ‘without an explicit understanding of the proximity and the 
distance between their fundamental theses’ (124). He finishes the book by considering a 
number of potential objections to contemporary Spinozism, and his suggestions for how 
to respond tend to lean again towards the importance of adopting a certain Hegelianism 
or insisting on locating a certain kind of ‘punctuation mark’ in Spinozist materialism (139-
145).
     The first chapter of the book provides a good indication of Moder’s style. It is a curious 
mix of relatively accessible analogies (e.g. absolute knowing as a ‘punctuation mark’) 
and what seem like deliberately esoteric expressions which do not receive sufficient 
explanation, for instance, ‘The beginning with thinking is only possible because – from the 
perspective of its result – it includes not-thinking as its not-beginning’ (25). It is still not 
clear to me that this sentence says anything useful about either Hegel’s Logic or its legacy 
in contemporary philosophy. This chapter also exhibits another feature of Moder’s book 
that I found frustrating. While it purports to be an investigation into an issue between 
the philosophies of Hegel and Spinoza, it is often bizarrely devoid of engagement with 
the voluminous secondary literature which exists on the topics with which it engages. 
Beyond acknowledging several influential yet somewhat dated works by Gadamer and 
Henrich, Moder shows almost no interest in the large body of work which exists on the 
issues surrounding the beginning of Hegel’s Logic, despite devoting an entire chapter to 
the topic. This chapter, as in other places in the book, feels problematically unscholarly. 
Instead, Moder focuses his attention on a creative re-imagining of the topic, the possible 
value of which is undermined to some extent by the obscurity of his presentation. He also 
has a tendency to attempt to mitigate the complexity of his writing, not with sustained, 
clear explanation, but with attempts at humour. It is in this vein that he opens the first 
chapter with a light-hearted anecdote about Jacques Chirac’s response to Eastern European 
support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, all so that he can arrive at a line about the beginning 
of Hegel’s Logic being ‘a missed opportunity to keep quiet’ (16). I did not feel that this was 
in any way helpful.   
     Despite stylistic issues, worries about obscurity, an occasional lack of scholarship, 
and the potential disappointment that will be experienced by any reader wanting a 
serious study of the philosophy of Hegel and Spinoza outside the arena of contemporary 
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European or continental philosophy, there is material that is original and interesting in 
Moder’s relatively short book. To reiterate, there is absolutely no doubt that it must be 
read as an intervention into the uses and misuses of Hegel and Spinoza in 20th and 21st 
century European materialism, even if Moder does not always make it sufficiently clear 
that this is what he is up to. That said, for readers heavily invested in work by the likes of 
Deleuze, Althusser, and Žižek there will be much here that is provocative and demanding 
of a response. At times, the brevity of the book feels very much as though it is the first 
word in such a conversation. This is visible, for instance, in the way that Moder hops from 
one topic to the next in Chapter 3, making significant claims without always supporting 
them with detailed argumentation. This contributes to the sense that the book is a series 
of explorations into things Moder happens to be interested in, rather than exhibiting a 
coherent overall structure or arguing towards much in the way of firm conclusions, though 
this is not necessarily a criticism.
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